Abstract. Practice guidelines are standardized specifications for managing particular clinical problems and are intended to improve the outcomes of medical care by increasing adherence to standards of care. They are also meant to make medicine more cost-effective by eliminating unnecessary procedures. A relatively recent phenomenon, the practice guidelines now emerging will have implications for malpractice, which also intends to bring about better care. They will probably not revolutionize the procedures that courts use to determine negligence, but judges will integrate guidelines into their decision-making process. This development should be welcomed. Guidelines should prove to be useful as either inculpatory or exculpatory evidence of negligence. They are unlikely to generate much new litigation, although there is some potential for suits against those who issue guidelines, especially if guidelines are not revised as the technology of medical care changes.
Practice guidelines are standardized specifications for care, either for using a procedure or for managing a particular clinical problem (Leape 1989; Woolf 1990) . Over the last five years, many experts in health care have advocated broader use of parameters or guidelines as a means for rationalizing the practice of medicine and restraining its costs (Leape 1990; Kelly and Swartout 1990) . Some members of Congress have placed a premium on development of guidelines (Hatch 1989) , and the Physicians Payment Review Commission is actively studying their utility (Hammons 1989) .
Interest in practice guidelines grows out of the recent upsurge in two lines of health services research: in outcomes (Donabedian 1966; Knaus et al. 1986 ; like other areas of tort law, is intended to bring about better care by visiting sanctions on those who injure patients while using substandard techniques (Franklin and Rabin 1987) .
Although guidelines will not remake the system that courts use to determine negligence, in time judges will surely incorporate guidelines into decisions. In fact, guidelines should act as useful inculpatory or exculpatory evidence of the standard of care. While there will be some pitfalls along the way, and policymakers, guideline developers, and judges should be aware of these, most fears about a potential conflict between practice guidelines and litigation are exaggerated.' A review of the relationship between malpractice litigation and practice guidelines reveals that such guidelines will generate few new malpractice suits; indeed, if anything, they should lead to better litigation and eventually to better care.
Malpractice litigation
Medical malpractice litigation, like all of tort law, is intended to decrease the incidence of accidents and to compensate the injuries suffered by the victims of the accidents (Calabresi 1970) . In theory, the injured patient (the plaintiff) proves that he was i n @ , that the health care provider (the defendant) failed to meet a standard of care expected in the community, and that there is a causal relationship between the injury and the failure to meet the standard of care (negligence) (Franklin and Rabin 1987) . While under tort law the defendant is to pay the damage award, most health care providers carry malpractice insurance. Thus, insurers pay in the event of successful suits.
This seemingly straightforward system has engendered a great deal of debate over the last decade. Rates of claim and the average severity of claims have increased episodically, leading to rapid cyclical increases in physicians' and other health care workers' liability insurance premiums (Bovbjerg 1989) . As a result, physicians and their insurers have joined a number of other defendants who seek protection from claims through so-called tort reform (Brennan and Weiler 1990) . Malpractice litigation has also been questioned on economic grounds (Tancredi and Barondess 1978; Reynolds et al. 1987 ) and emotional grounds (Charles et al. 1985; Hubbard 1989 ). More recently, some have charged that obstetricians and family practitioners are reducing their practice as a result of poor reimbursement under Medicaid combined with rising malpractice premiums (Hughes et al. 1990 ).
These charges assume that there is too much rather than too little tort litigation. Just the opposite conclusion was reached by reseazchers in California in the mid-1970s. Mills and associates demonstrated that the rate of compensable events caused by negligence in hospitals was only slightly less than 1 percent of all admissions (California Medical Association 1976). Danzon's (1985) subsequent analysis revealed that fewer than one in ten negligently injured patients brought a suit.
The recently completed Harvard Medical Practice Study (1990) sheds further light on malpractice litigation and medical injury. The researchers found that between 1975 and 1989, 3.7 percent of hospitalizations in New York state resulted in adverse events, 27 percent of which were due to negligence. The majority of adverse events resulted in disability, but 14 percent of patients died, at least in part because of the event.
The Medical Practice Study report also provides a comparison of medical injury with malpractice claims. The researchers reviewed all claims files from the state of New York between 1975 and 1989; for the year 1984, they estimated, there were between 3,600 and 3,800 malpractice claims. Combining these figures with the number of injuries caused by medical negligence statewide, they calculated that seven to eight times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as filed a malpractice claim. When malpractice claims were matched to the medical record review results, an even more disturbing picture developed. Only 1 to 2 percent of individuals who suffered a negligent injury file a malpractice claim. On the other hand, approximately 85 percent of malpractice claims are filed in cases in which there was ruled to be neither negligence nor injury. This suggests that many litigants and their lawyers have no idea whether or not the standard of care was met in their particular case. Lack of information regarding standards of care may also help to account for of the failure of injured patients to litigate.
So there is no evidence that we have been experiencing too many malpractice claims; if anything, there appear to be too few. Moreover, the tort process is erratic, with many claims arising from cases where there is no negligence and few from episodes of negligent injury. It is in this light that we must understand the relationship between practice guidelines and malpractice litigation. Guidelines would fivstrate the functions of malpractice litigation if they decrease the number of viable claims. They would enhance litigation if they helped ensure that courts found on behalf of injured patients, in cases where the standard of care was not met, and in cases where the standard of care was met, defendant physicians were exculpated.
Practice guidelines: their p k e in Wgation
To understand their impact on litigation, one must ask, what are practice guidelines? Their popularity has been clearer than their content. Practice guidelines are suggestions, perhaps in the form of rules, perhaps in the form of al-70 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law gorithms, that reflect the best or most appropriate way to care for a certain clinical illness (Leape 1990) . This is a very broad definition. Internal medicine textbooks, for instance, would constitute practice guidelines under this definition, since they contain a great deal of idormation on how to diagnose certain problems as well as suggestions regarding appropriate therapy. It is clear, however, that advocates would not consider far longer and mre comprehensive textbooks to be practice guidelines. Rather, they look for explicit formulae for the best way to provide medical care in a certain situation.
Practice guidelines can be classified in a usehl fashion according to their intent. Most, to date, involve definitions of appropriateness, in that they focus on the propriety of the indications for a (usually diagnostic) procedure. For instance, unstable angina refktory to drug therapy is an appropriate indication for cardiac angiography, while poorly defined chest wall pain is not. Since many p r d u r e s are performed inappropriately, in that they lack clear indications, these guidelines can help bring about more cost-effective care by eliminating U M~C~S S~ tests. Although some people say that cost is not the important issue, and that a procedure is appropriate if the benefits to the patient's health exceed the risks (Brook 1989), cost-effectiveness is usually the driving force behind development of uppropriuteness guidelines. These are intended to reduce care that is unnecessary or inefficient in cost.
Another sort of guideline emphasizes outcomes, not cost-efficiency. For instance, a guideline may state that if critical stenosis of the left main coronary artery is present, one should perform coronary revascularization. It defines the standard of practice, presumably as a result of implicit or explicit assessment of outcomes; it is not motivated by cost-efficiency. This is a standard-oj-cure guideline.
The distinction between appropriateness and standard-of-care guidelines is one of nuance. The intent of the parameter is critical. A patient, say, has rectal bleeding, which can be a harbinger of colon cancer. Appropriateness guidelines would outline the most cost-effective way to evaluate this problem. Both types of guideline have malpractice implications but their respective impacts will be quite different.4 Appropriateness guidelines w i l l play a relatively narrow role in suits against physicians. Typically, the patient alleges that there were no appropriate indications for the procedure and cites the appropriateness standard evidence against the physician. For instance, a person might sue a physician for worming a carotid endarterectomy when the only indication was episodic dizzy spells. The guideline is inculpatory.
Since the damages in such a case would be relatively minor (health care costs and time out of work), suits based on inappropriateness will probably be rather uncommon. It is important to note, however, that 3.7 percent of hospitalizations lead to injuries caused by the medical care (Harvard Medical Practice Study 1990) . Any such injuries occurring during an unindicated hospitalization would be cornpensable under existing tort law, even if the injury itself was not the result of negligence. Patients suffering medical injury may therefore tend to scrutinize the indications for their care more closely. Moreover, widespread development of appropriateness guidelines may lead to greater patient awareness and more suits for inappropriate care. In any case, these suits should be welcomed by those interested in using guidelines to eliminate unnecessary care. The courts could use guideline evidence to find on behalf of plaintiffs, creating a strong deterrent against inappropriate care.
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of clinical judgment in test ordering. Alper (1989) recognizes that the guidelines are primarily directed at reducing the broad use of diagnostic tests. Some internists oppose restrictions on testing, since they charge a specific fee based on the ordering of such tests, and reducing the frequency of the use of such tests would reduce incomes. See %nnenbaum (1989) .
3. Since 1977, the NJH Office of Medical Applications of Research has attempted to disseminate important information regarding changes in the scientific basis of medicine to the health care pkssion and to the public through the Consensus Development Program. See W o r t m a n et al. (1988) . Between 1980 and 1986, the NIH completed sixty consensus conferences covering a variety of techniques, devices, and drugs. Some of their recommendations ate explicit. For instance, regarding the treatment of primary breast cancer, a consensus conference recommended t o t a l mastectomy with axillary dissection in women with stage one or early stage two disease. On the other hand, for coronary artery bypass surgery, one recommendation was that the workup should be efficient, and another was that high-risk patients should undergo comnary angiography and, if justified by the patient's symptoms lack of response to medical management, coronary artery bypass surgery should be p e r f d . The latter set of recommendatons gives practitioners a great deal of leeway. The former set of recommendations, regarding treatment of primary breast cancer, leaves much less room for physician judgment. The NIH consensus c-nces represent, at least in some cases, an effort to get experts to provide clinical standard-of-care guidelines that define good care, not just cost-efficient care.
4.
Use of practice guidelines has in the past stimulated questions regarding their role in malpractice litigation. For example, the Peer Standards Review Organizations pnrmpted speculation regarding malpractke. See King (1975) . Kinney and W i l d e r (1989) have discussed practice guidelines and malpractice litigation in some detail. Their analysis does not criticaliy examine and categorize practice guidelines, nor have they discussed in detail the interaction of guidelines and litigation.
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The subject and nature of the appropriateness guideline will dictate, to a large extent, the utility of the guideline during litigation. Guidelines which deal with procedures that carry some risk of injury are more likely to be used as evidence. For example, an individual who undergoes coronary artery bypass surgery for a particular indication and then suffers an injury as a result of that operation may subsequently question the appropriateness of the indication upon which the physicians relied. If the indication was inappropriate according to a guideline, for instance, this idormation would be of great value in the individual's suit. Guidelines concerning appropriate use of diagnostic tests, like an electrocardiogram (EKG), will not often be used as evidence under this theory, simply because there is little chance that an EKG would cause injury.
The other instance where an appropriateness guideline would be central in a malpractice suit is when it cited as exculpatory evidence in the "failure to diagnose" case. A physician could take note of a guideline and decide not to perform a certain diagnostic test. The patient may later allege that in omitting the test, the physicians failed to make an important diagnosis and, as a result, the patient suffered an injury. Assuming the physician is simply trying to provide appropriate care, he or she must tailor any use of a guideline's recommendations to the individual patient. If this is done in a reasonable manner, it stands to reason that the court will find the guideline itself persuasive evidence that the physician has met a standard of care.
Moreover, courts will realize that the exculpatory use of guidelines will help eliminate one of the debilitating by-products of litigation-defensive medicine. Defensive medicine is defined as those medical practices that "are employed explicitly for the purposes either of averting a possible law suit or of providing appropriate documentation that a wide range of tests and treatments has been used in the patient's care" (Tancredi and Barondess 1978) . There have been various estimates of these costs, ranging from $3-$6 billion in 1975 to $15-$40 billion in 1983 (Reynolds et al. 1987) , although other studies question these high estimates. Hershey's (1971) early interview study suggested that doctors were using some extra diagnostic tests as defensive medicine, but the total cost of these tests was quite small. Another study, by the editors of the Duke Law Journal, also questioned the widespread existence of defensive medicine (Special Project 1971). Tancredi and Barondess reached much the same conclusion in their influential review in 1978. Thus, as Harris (1987) stated in an editorial that accompanied a recent study, "We need to probe behind the survey responses analyzed by Reynolds and colleagues to uncover the microanatomic detail of defensive medicine ." Nonetheless, defensive medicine remains a potent rallying cry for the medical profession even though it is very difficult to assess the size of the problem it represents.
Practice guidelines provide clinicians with firm protocols for diagnosing and treating some illnesses and could potentially counter physicians' fears that they must take additional steps to avoid malpractice liability. For instance, if a prac-
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tice guideline developed by a prestigious national organization asserts that it is unnecessary to complete a computed tomogram (CT) scan of the head on a patient who has suffered head trauma but no loss of consciousness, the clinician will be much less apt to complete the CT simply out of fear of litigation that might ensue if this turns out to be the one patient (out of several thousands similarly injured) who subsequently develops a problem that could have been diagnosed by the CT scan (Masters et al. 1987) . The guideline provides important, independent evidence for the court that the practitioner acted reasonably.
Standard-of-care guidelines should play a more prominent role in litigation. They provide direct evidence on the critical issue of negligence and are thus applicable to a much larger set of malpractice claims than appropriateness guidelines. For example, a woman may allege that her breast cancer was treated in a substandard fashion. She could cite the NIH consensus guideline as inculpatory evidence. In another case, physicians defending the care they rendered might cite the same guideline as exculpatory evidence. In both cases, the guidelines would provide the court with objective, neutral evidence of the standard of care. Thus, as with appropriateness guidelines, standard-of-care guidelines will help rationalize malpractice litigation.
One should not underestimate the importance of this function of practice guidelines. Many judges and lawyers today are discouraged by the quality of expert testimony on scientific issues (Weinstein 1989; Wessel 1988) . They witness case after case in which the adversarial process produces diametrically opposed opinions regarding medical or scientific issues. Neither side in litigation perceives any strategic value in moderating its testimony. The introduction of practice guidelines could lead to such moderation, as experts would have to reveal the relationship of their own opinion to that of the prestigious guideline issuer (Brennan 1989) .
Indeed, if the development of standard-of-care guidelines were to burgeon, one might find them playing a central role in malpractice litigation. Courts might take independent judicial notice of guidelines, or at least expect the opposing experts to brief the importance of the guideline to the case.' Clem guidelines would thus help rationalize litigation by providing standards for courts, which now have to rely on less-than-objective battles of experts. We are no doubt a long way from having parameters play a truly central role in either medical practice or medical malpractice litigation, as we lack decent information on the outcome of most procedures (Epstein 1990) , but the prospect is, nonetheless, that such standards will improve the quality of litigation. Moreover, courts have begun to hold other doctors to these standards.6 Thus as practice guidelines develop in other areas, they could lead to better care and fewer malpractice claims.7 Practice guidelines as they stand at present will be integrated into medical malpractice litigation but will not soon lead to major changes. Individuals alleging negligence will still identlfy experts, and these experts must testify regarding the guidelines. For the present, the role of guidelines in malpractice litigation will be similar to the role played by very important review articles. Guidelines will not bestow advantage selectively on plaintiffs or on defendants.
They can provide both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. Thus the overall impact of practice guidelines in malpractice litigation against providers for now should be rather small, just as their overall impact on clinical practice is still minimal (Lomas et al. 1989; Epstein 1990 ). In the long run, however, they may help increase the quality of care and so decrease litigation; moreover, they may help rationalize that litigation which does occur by providing clear standards.
Guidelines as evidence
Guidelines should have a salutory effect on malpractice litigation. It depends, however, on their conformity to rules of evidence. In particular, we must con- In scientific cases, this would technically prohibit an expert from testifying about the view of another scientist, or even of the scientific community. The common law has, however, evolved an exception to the hearsay rule to allow experts to testify regarding the contents of "learned treatises." In the last ten to fifteen years, moreover, courts have further loosened restrictions on testimony by experts: the exception to the hearsay rule for learned treatises has been widened greatly and in a variety of different cases regarding scientific evidence, testimony that amounts to a review of scientific literature has become cornmonplace (Brennan 1989) . Since practice guidelines are relevant and since they usually appear in peer-reviewed journals or other accepted authorities, it seems very likely that a plaintiff's or defendant's expert will be able to testify citing such practice guidelines as part of his or her testimony.' Nor are there other potential bars for admissibility. Certainly the locality rule (requiring testimony on the standard of care by local experts) should not play a role. In most jurisdictions, this rule has been overturned by common law courts. Efforts to reinstitute it by state legislatures have largely failed (Bovbjerg 1989) . Since much of appropriateness research is designed to reduce geographic variations in care, it seems very unlikely that courts will restrict testimony on appropriateness because of slight differences in standards of practice between regions.
It is also doubtful that courts will restrict testimony regarding practice standards because the individual practitioner subscribes to a "school of thought" that is different from that suggested by the parameter. While practice parameters See, e.g., Belli (1956) . However, since experts on all subjects are now widely available, the guidelines will be likely to come into court as something relied on by experts in their testimony.
might not apply to chiropractors for instance, it seems very unlikely that any allopathic physician would be able to exclude testimony regarding practice guidelines on such grounds, as practice guidelines are usually well within the mainstream of allopathic medicine.
Once guideline evidenm is admitted, there remain questions regarding the weight to be attached to it whether regarding appropriateness or standards of care. In litigation on any technical issue, including malpractice litigation, experts typically disclose the basis for their opinion, usually in the form of quotations from learned treatises and published articles in the medical literature (Brennan 1989) . At the very least, practice guidelines would function as foundational support for testimony and thus carry the weight of important review articles. More likely, since they are endorsed by prestigious groups in many circumstances, practice guidelines will be very influential.
The practice guidelines will have different impacts on cases, depending on whether they are used as inculpatory or exculpatory evidence. If they are used as inculpatory evidence, the opposing litigants will almost certainly counter practice guideline testimony with a "respected minority" theory. Suppose a plaintiff uses a practice standard as evidence that a procedure was inappropriate.
The defendant's attorneys could parry by granting that the practice guideline indicates inappropriateness but point out that not everyone agrees with the guideline, indeed that a "respected minority" agrees with the defendant's assessment that the procedure was appropriate (Holder 1978) . Given this tack, the importance of practice standard evidence would always be countered.
Courts have recognized that the respected minority doctrine makes a plaintiff s proof of the standard of care more difficult, and in the past decade courts have frequently addressed the doctrine's use. For example, in the case of Hood v. Phillips,'o the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the respected minority doctrine was inferior to a reasonable and prudent physician standard in that the former conveys to the jury the incorrect notion that the standard for malpractice was to be determined by a poll of the profession. In another case, the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that reasonable physicians could disagree on the appropriateness of treating a forty-eight-year-old patient with intravenous lidocaine during admission to the hospital. 'I The mere demonstration of a respected minority point of view is not dispositive.
In both these cases, the respected minority standard was used as exculpatory evidence. This is in fact the manner it is used generally,12 and it can still carry considerable weight. One could, however, envision that courts may in the future rule that care conflicting with a practice guideline is not "respected." Thus the coevolution of practice guidelines and the respected minority doctrine will bear watching in the next decade. In any case, it appears that courts are not straight jacketed by the respected minority doctrine, at least insofar as mere demnstration of a respected minority position is not itself exculpatory. Practice guidelines will be important evidence regarding the reasonableness and prudence of a physician's actions.
We should not, however, expect that practice guidelines used for inculpatory purposes will ever establish per se negligence. The negligence per se doctrine has not been extended to industry standards or other forms of private regulation.
All the practice guidelines reviewed above are replete with explicit statements that the practice parameters are simply guidelines and should not replace individual clinical judgment. No practice guideline recommends a single clinical practice "in all circumstances." Courts recognize! this. For instance, a California court has noted that a physician's decision to deviate from the American H e a r t Association's guidelines for cardiopulmonary resuscitation by using atropine rather than epinephrine is not necessarily negligent.I3 Thus it is doubtful that courts will find that a guideline itself establishes neghgence.
Of course, just as the respected minority doctrine can be used to exculpate defendants who have failed to follow typical practices, so too, can practice guidelines exculpate defendants who follow them. There is indeed precedent for use of standards as strong exculpatory evidence. The federal government provides civil liability immunity for physicians treating Medicare patients who do so in accordance with AYX Review Organization criteria.14 though this immunity seems fairly clear in the statutory language, it is rarely used as a defense by practitioners. Some have argued that since the immunity is predicated on due care of the practitioner complying with the standards, the common law liability standards are reintroduced into any analysis of the care provider (Morreim 1987). Be this as it my, it would seem that practice standards complied with by an individual practitioner will be important, if not totally exculpatory, evidence in a common law proceeding.
The use of standards as evidence may be accelerated by state tort reform intended to provide relief for sued physicians and hospitals (Meyer 1990). In the state of Maine, recent legislation provides the impetus for the development of guidelines over the next five years in anesthesia, emergency medicine, and obstetrics. The state will review and approve these provider-developed guidelines. After approval, defendants who have decided to participate in the experiment can have suits dismissed outright if they can prove they complied with 
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Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law the guidelines. This initiative formalizes the exculpatory role of guidelines and will probably be widely followed, although plaintiffs' advocates and attorneys will oppose such refam. In summary, practice guidelines will be admissible and w i l l resonate with other legal doctrines concerning their weight as evidence. Legislation could formalize the use of guidelines as evidence in malpractice litigation.
Litig&n ag*t grrideline isswrs
In addition to their use as evidemce in malpractice litigation, guidelines, and those who issue them, may be the targets of litigation. A plaintiff (first party) d d allege that the treating physician relied on the guideline, that the guideline issuer (third party) owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, and that the guideline was negligently formulated or proved to be defk~tive.'~ Could a plaintiff win a third-party suit against a guideline issuer? It seems doubtful, for at least four reasons. The first is that in medicine the duty to care strongly resides with the treating physician. This issue has been faced in the area of utilization review. An injured patient sued a third-party insurer because the insurer, in an effort to cut costs, exerted pressure on the physician to discharge the patient from the hospital. The court ruled that while "there is little doubt that Dr. Polansky 
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The second reason such suits have little chance for success is that courts have recognized that third parties issuing guidelines usually do so for the benefit of the public. Extending the duty to care to these third parties would chill their interest in an activity that benefits the general Mmver, while the Restatement @Torts 2nd does suggest that third parties, such as product standard setting groups, can have duties to care, there is usually some direct relationship between the third party and the product, as fix instance when the third party inspects a specific product which later causes an injury." There is no such relationship in the case of practice guidelines.
A third reason why a plaintiff might not win a W-party suit against a guideline issuer is that many guidelines represent little more than compilations of existing medical literature and as such provide only very narrow grounds for a suit. Guidelines are generally developed by individuals who cull and summarize the literature and are quite similar to review articles written for those publications. Although they bear the imprimatur of a prestigious agency, the intellectual effart is much the same as that which goes into the development of a review article. What would constitute negligent issuing of guidelines? W p s failure to replace obsolete standards is one such situation. For example, a medical society could be liable for negligent performance of an undertaking if it failed to update its practice guidelines on a periodic and regular basis. Suppose that after certain procedure guidelines are published, a prospective trial regarding the safety and efficacy of the procedure is performed and demonstrates that the guidelines are incorrect. At that point, the guidelines are flawed and probably ought to be reconsidered by the issuer. If in the meantime a physician relies on the guidelines and fails to undertake the procedure, then the injured patient could make a persuasive case that the guidelines were negligently maintained. While these kinds of suits might be partially prevented through the use of boiler-plate language to the effect that medical knowledge constantly changes, there is still a potential for litigation.
Since guidelines could have a broad impact on medical practice, courts may also hold guideline issuers to higher standards than they do other actors. For instance, a judge might assume that imposition of strict liability would make guideline issuers especially carefbl (Epstein 1973) . In addition, judges could reject the "state of the art" defenses which medical societies would raise (Wade 1983) , greatly increasing the potential liability of medical society." Thus, while it seems at this point that guideline issuers should not be too concerned about litigation, no one can posit that litigation is impossible.
To minimize the possibility of litigation, guideline issuers should take some precautions. In particular, they should state that patient treatment decisions are best made by individual physicians in the context of the individual patient's case, and that guidelines should not be viewed as a substitute for medical judgment by the physician. Of course, these caveats will make it more difficult to use guidelines as inculpatory evidence, and they should be judged in that light.
Conclwwn
Most of the guidelines available today do not elaborate clinical standards of care; they cover the indications appropriate for certain procedures and so affect only that fraction of malpractice litigation Concerned with cost-effective care.
In the future, however, as guidelines define more precisely the standard of practice for individual diseases, they could play an important and beneficial role in malpractice litigation. They could improve the quality of evidence placed before courts and increase the possibility that plaintiffs with viable claims will pursue them, thus strengthening the deterrence function of tort law. They could also improve the quality of care and hence reduce the need for litigation.
Medical societies and others who issue guidelines can ensure that these guidelines play an effective role in malpractice litigation by following some simple prescriptions. In parhcular, guideline issuers should clearly state that the guidelines are always voluntary and that they do not define the approach to every individual case. They should also indicate that acceptable medical practice includes a variety of responses to particular clinical problems. Any practice guidelines that go beyond compilation of the medical literature and, through a consensus process, develop a new intellectual basis far practice should be completed through scientifically valid methods.
If legal prescriptions far guidelines are followed, it is likely that the conduct of malpractice litigation will change somewhat. Guidelines w i l l be used by experts to support their positions on behalf of either plaintiffs or defendants. As clear statements of the standard of care, they can only help improve the litigation process. This should lead to a tighter connection between the detemnt effect of tort litigation and quality-of-care initiatives.
